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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of decision 
rule, minority discrepancy from the majority, minority sex, and group- 
member sex on the minority's ability to influence group members in a 
mock-jury deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case.
The mixed-sex groups deliberated under either a unanimous or 
majority decision rule, and were composed of 4 or 5 naive group 
members and a confederate (either male or female), who expressed a 
minority opinion that was either high or low in discrepancy from other 
group members.
The results showed that a minority's influence is related to the 
interactive effects of decision rule and minority's discrepancy from 
the majority, such that minority influence was greatest under the 
combined conditions of a unanimous decision rule and low minority- 
majority discrepancy, and least under a non-unanimous decision rule 
and low discrepancy. High discrepancy, regardless of decision rule, 
was associated with intermediate levels of minority influence.
Although group members were influenced equally by male and 
female minorities, group members of both sexes perceived the female 
minority as less influential than the male minority.
Implications for the legal and social influence literatures are 
discussed.
ACTIVE MINORITIES AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Social influence has been a widely studied phenomenon in social 
psychology. Beginning with Sherif's (1936) study of autokinetic 
effects and Asch's (1951) experiments with line-length estimation, the 
study of social influence has dealt primarily with a group's ability 
to induce an individual to conform. Less attention has been paid to 
minorities who resist the influence of the group and try to induce the 
majority to accept their position (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; Nemeth, 
1977). Asch (1956) pointed out that it is incorrect to assume that 
social influence is completely explained by a theory of conformity to 
group norms.
This paper presents an overview of the minority influence 
literature, and then discusses some issues that have not been fully 
examined in this area. The primary focus is on factors affecting 
minority influence in jury deliberations. Within the last 30 years 
many states have passed legislation allowing for majority decision 
rules in jury deliberations instead of the traditional unanimous rule. 
Concern has been expressed for the effect of majority decision rules 
on the quality of jury deliberations, especially in situations where a 
minority of jurors believe the defendant to be innocent. This paper 
addresses the issue of the effect of decision rule on the minority's 
ability to influence other group members.
2
3Secondly, this study addresses the effect of the extremeness of 
the minority's position on their ability to influence the majority, 
and whether the decision rule interacts with the minority's 
discrepancy from the majority to affect differentially the majority’s 
reaction to the minority. Finally, the implications of the minority 
influence person's sex, as well as the sex of the target, are 
discussed. Although sex differences in influenceability and 
persuasibility have been studied extensively in other social influence 
frameworks, this topic has not received much attention in the minority 
influence literature.
Majority Influence
Without question, majorities exert powerful influences, as shown 
by an early study by Sherif (1936). Subjects made perceptual 
judgments privately, then publicly, and then again privately.
Subjects converged their judgments of the autokinetic effect during 
the public trials to form a group norm, and maintained this norm 
during the second phase of private judgments. Sherif's findings 
indicated that in an ambiguous situation people will publicly comply 
with the group norm, and also internalize that norm.
Asch (1951) had individual male subjects, in the presence of 
confederates who gave incorrect answers, state their choices for which 
of three lines was equal in length to a standard line. Thirty-three 
percent of the subjects conformed to the majority judgment on at least 
half of the critical trials. Further, almost 75 percent of the 
subjects gave the group's answer on at least one trial. Cartwright 
and Zander (1968) noted:
4In this experiment the critical subject is 
unacquainted with the other participants and ... 
they make no overt effort to influence his 
behavior. His judgments, moreover, concern matters 
having little intrinsic importance to him, to his 
future relations with the others, and to the fate 
of those in the room. Nevertheless, there are 
clearly strong pressures on him to conform. One 
would surely expect these pressures to be even 
stronger in more natural settings and with respect 
to matters having greater significance for the 
participants, (pp. 139-140)
Schachter (1951) found that majorities exerted strong pressure by 
initially increasing communication to the deviate and then following 
with rejection if the deviate did not yield. Until recently, anyone 
reviewing the literature would have had to conclude that there existed 
only two courses open to a minority: conformity to the group norm or
rejection by the group.
Majority Influence: A Different Interpretation
As noted by several researchers (e.g., Moscovici, 1985; Moscovici 
& Faucheux, 1972; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974), minorities exert 
influence. In contrast to the influence of the majority are 
innovations in such fields as politics, science, business, and art, 
usually originating and succeeding through the determined efforts of 
minorities. Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) interpreted some of the 
classic conformity research from the perspective of the minority's
5influence on group opinion. Findings from the Asch (1951) procedure 
are often attributed to the naive subject's acceptance of the majority 
judgment as defining social reality. Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) 
pointed out, however, that subjects already have a general norm of 
perceptual judgment that has developed prior to their participation in 
a laboratory experiment; that is, their experience in the world has 
already defined social and physical reality for them before they enter 
the experimental situation. In the Asch procedure, subjects are 
confronted with confederates who adhere to a different norm--a norm 
that is a minority norm in the eyes of the subject. Following this 
approach, Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) suggested that the group of 
confederates really constitute a minority that is able to influence a 
majority member. They compared the naive subjects' situation to that 
of a captive audience (e.g., prisoners of war) and concluded that "the 
Asch experiments show that a consistent minority can modify, under 
certain circumstances, the predominant norm" (p. 153).
According to Moscovici and Faucheux (1972), the same type of 
reasoning can be applied to the Jacobs and Campbell (1961) study that 
used the autokinetic effect to study the transmission of norms in 
groups of four. Subjects made public judgments for 30 trials, and 
then one experienced subject was replaced by a naive subject. In the 
experimental condition, the initial group consisted of three 
confederates, who gave extreme judgments, and one naive subject. At 
the end of the first block of 30 trials, a confederate was replaced 
with a naive subject. This replacement continued every 30 trials, so 
that all confederates were eventually withdrawn and replaced by naive 
subjects. The transmission of the arbitrary norm to replacement
6subjects continued through the seventh block of 30 trials. That is, 
even though the members of the original experimental group had all 
been replaced by the fourth block of trials, the judgments of 
replacement members continued to be more extreme than those of control 
subjects until the seventh trial block. Moscovici and Faucheux 
pointed out that the norm transmitted through several subject 
generations was found to decrease in extremity as each replacement 
subject joined the group until the group's norm was not significantly 
different from that of the control group. So it is possible to 
consider each naive subject as exerting a minority influence on the 
group's j udgments.
The tendency to focus on the minority's conformity to the 
majority, the conformity bias (Nemeth, 1977), is apparent even in 
definitions of social influence and related concepts such as public 
compliance and private acceptance. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) have 
referred to social pressure that results in public compliance as 
"normative social influence". In this situation, the group is able to 
obtain compliance by exerting norms and by using sanctions against 
nonconformers. "Informational social influence" refers to the type of 
social influence that leads to private acceptance by supplying the 
individual with information relevant to the issue. Social sanctions 
are not necessary as the information itself is sufficient to produce 
the desired change. In both cases, the minority is being influenced 
by the majority. As Nemeth (1977) pointed out, the majority's basis 
for influence is the minority's dependence on the majority for 
approval (normative influence) and information about social reality 
(informational influence). A minority, on the other hand, clearly
7lacks the numbers to Impose either type of influence, leaving other 
factors to be explored for their contribution to the influence of a 
minority.
Basis of Minority Influence: Behavioral Style
Moscovici and Nemeth (1974) hypothesized that the behavioral 
style of the minority, facilitated by the attention focused toward the 
minority, is responsible for the minority influence found in their, 
and their associates', research (e.g., Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972; 
Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974;
Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983). 
Specifically, behavioral consistency over time seems to be critical to 
minority influence (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969), with 
consistent patterning, rather than rigid consistency, being a more 
effective strategy (Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974). The minority's 
consistency should follow a pattern that agrees with variations in the 
situation and not maintain a rigid position. This flexibility creates 
an impression of confidence and certainty, while minimizing the 
ability of the group to reject the minority on the basis of 
idiosyncratic behavior. Rejection of an individual deviate is the 
initial response of most group members, as demonstrated in an early 
Asch (1952) study. An individual confederate who made inaccurate 
judgments in the presence of 16 naive subjects was laughed at or 
ignored, whereas two confederates who gave inaccurate responses were 
not laughed at, and Asch (1952) reported that they were taken much 
more seriously.
The importance of consistency over time to minority influence was 
examined by Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969). Subjects made
8judgments about the color and brightness of slides, prepared so that 
the intensity of the light passing through the slide varied but was 
always within the blue wavelength scale. In one condition, two 
confederates reported that they saw green on each of the 36 trials.
In the other condition the two confederates randomly (but always 
agreeing with each other) called the stimulus "green" on two-thirds of 
the trials and "blue" on the remaining trials. Naive subjects in the 
consistent condition called the stimulus "green" 8.42 percent of the 
time, which was significantly different from subjects in the control 
condition who considered the stimulus green only 0.25 percent of the 
time. In the inconsistent condition, naive subjects reported "green" 
only 1.25 percent of the time and were not significantly different 
from the control subjects. The minority exerted influence only when 
it was consistent over time.
The second part of this study also provided evidence for minority 
influence. Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) believed that the 
subjects might maintain the majority position even though influenced 
by the minority, and they wanted to see whether the subjects exposed 
to the consistent minority would show signs of this influence in a 
subsequent blue-green designation threshold task. Subjects were shown 
16 discs, 3 of which were unambiguously blue, 3 unambiguously green 
and 10 which might have appeared ambiguous. Thirty-seven of the 40 
subjects called the blue stimuli "green" more often than the control 
subjects, indicating a modification in their judgments that was 
consistent with the position of the minority in the first part of the 
study.
9In another study, Moscovici and Faucheux (1972) had subjects in 
groups of four or five publicly state and privately record their 
preferences for either the size, color, shape or line variations in a 
series of drawings. In the experimental group, a confederate 
consistently gave "color" as his answer. Color was chosen 
significantly more often in the experimental group than in the control 
group. The consistent behavior of the minority was credited with 
producing this effect.
In a later experiment, the salience of the minority’s 
consistency was increased by having an assistant record each person's 
responses on a large board. Moscovici and Faucheaux (1972) made the 
following assumptions about this procedure: (1) subjects could see
which people were answering the same as others; (2) subjects were in 
the position of making highly public commitment; (3) subjects could 
see that the minority person was never influenced by anyone else, and; 
(4) the consistent behavior of the minority appeared unrelated to 
reality. Comparison of the first half of 64 trials with the second 
half showed a significant decrease in responses of "color", indicating 
rejection of the minority. The researchers pointed out that Cohen 
(1963) found extreme majority answers in the Asch paradigm yielded 
greater conformity in the earlier trials with a gradual shift to the 
more accurate answers. So there seems to be a limit to the influence 
phenomenon: Individuals (or groups) cease to be influential when
their position clearly appears unrelated to reality.
Nemeth, Swedlund, and Kanki (1974) posited that the perception of 
realistic consistency on the part of the minority could be maintained 
through consistent patterning of responses. They hypothesized that
10
the majority's perception that the minority has a firmly-held position 
is necessary for minority influence, and further, that the minority's 
position will still be seen as consistent when it modifies its 
position in response to changes in the situation or stimulus. The 
experiment which tested this hypothesis used a paradigm very much like 
the one used by Moscovici, Lage, and Naffrechoux (1969). Each 
experimental group consisted of two confederates and four naive 
subjects. The slides were blue, but varied in brightness. In one 
experimental condition, the confederates said they saw the color as 
"green'* on 50% of the trials, and "green-blue" on the other trials in 
a predetermined random order (random condition). Two brightness-color 
correlated conditions were used: In one, the confederates assigned
"green-blue" to 14 slides that were brightest and "green" to the 14 
least bright slides, and in the other condition "green-blue" was 
assigned to the least bright slides and "green" to the brightest. Two 
straight repetition conditions were included in which the confederates 
consistently said "green" on each trial (straight green condition), or 
"green-blue" on every trial (straight green-blue condition).
The two brightness-color correlated conditions yielded the 
greatest amount of minority influence and were significantly more 
effective than the random and straight green conditions (although the 
correlated conditions were not significantly different from the 
straight green-blue condition). The confederates in the brightness- 
color correlated conditions were considered more organized, more 
trusted, and more confident in their judgments. Nemeth et al 
concluded that the patterning of the confederate judgments and the 
perceptions produced by such patterns may be the foundation for
11
minority influence. Even though there was variation in the minority's 
position, they were at least as effective as the consistent green-blue 
confederates. The variations in the minority's position were tied to 
reality by being correlated with changes in brightness of the slides.
Recently researchers have attempted to integrate 
conceptualizations of minority and majority influence. Latane (1981; 
Latand & Wolf, 1981) suggested that social impact (either minority or 
majority influence) is a multiplicative function of the strength 
(e.g., status, power, and knowledge), immediacy (proximity in space 
and time), and number of group members (such that the first person has 
the strongest impact, with each additional person having a marginally 
decreasing impact). As discussed by Maass and Clark (1984), social 
impact theory's implications for minority influence is twofold: (1)
The first minority member will have the greatest influence, with each 
additional minority member having marginally less impact; and (2) 
there is no basic difference between the underlying mechanisms of 
minority and majority influence. The majority, then, will usually 
exert greater influence due to its greater number. A minority can 
only overcome this effect by greater consistency (equated with 
"strength" in this model).
Tanford and Penrod (1984) have refined Latane's model, but still 
suggest that "influence is predominantly a function of the number of 
targets and sources of influence," with "the consistency of the 
influence source ... also an important predictor of influence" (p.
189). Thus, recent theoretical work has sought to explain why 
majority influence is more common than minority influence.
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In summary, although a majority is predisposed to reject the 
deviate, under certain conditions (e.g., when the minority maintains a 
confident, realistic, and consistent position) minority influence 
occurs. The main purpose of this paper was to define further the 
effects of decision rule and the minority's discrepancy from the group 
on the minority's ability to influence the majority in a mock-jury 
deliberation.
Effect of Decision Rule and Minority Discrepancy
Decision rule. The emphasis of previous minority influence 
research has been on perceptual judgments. The effect of a minority 
in group decision-making on social or opinion topics has not been 
examined thoroughly. Minority influence processes are particularly 
salient in jury deliberations, and are assumed by Supreme Court 
Justices (Johnson v . Louisiana. 1972) to ensure that final verdicts 
are just. Historically, juries in the United States have been 
required to reach unanimous decisions, but within the last 30 years 
the trend has been to allow majority rule, where a verdict can be 
decided by a 10 to 2, or even a 9 to 3, vote. Nemeth (1981) pointed 
out the importance of examining the effects of jury decision rules 
(i.e., unanimity versus majority) on minorities' influence of 
majorities' decisions to convict or to acquit defendants.
There are several aspects to this issue. First, there is concern 
that a majority will not consider the arguments of a minority whose 
votes are not needed for conviction, that is, where the majority is 
large enough to satisfy the decision rule. Although Kalven and Zeisel 
(1966) found that 5.6% of cases result in hung juries (i.e., 
nonunanimous verdicts) under unanimity requirements, Saks and Hastie
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(1978) found that 25% of verdicts are not reached by consensus in 
those states that allow for nonunanimous decisions. Nemeth (1977) 
found that mock-juries didn't stop deliberating when a 2/3 majority 
rule was met, but that they did not continue until full consensus was 
reached. Further, the 2/3 majority rule groups stopped significantly 
short of consensus compared to groups under a unanimity decision rule. 
The Nemeth (1977) and Saks and Hastie (1978) findings support the idea 
that a majority may be more likely to disregard a minority's arguments 
when a group is not required to reach a unanimous decision.
A second issue concerns the effects of decision rules on the 
nature of the deliberation process and the possibility that discussion 
under a unanimity rule might be more robust than under majority rule. 
Nemeth (1977) found that unanimity groups not only required more 
deliberation time compared to majority groups, but also gave more 
information and opinions during the discussion. Unanimity group 
members reported experiencing more conflict than did majority-rule 
group members. This is of particular note in light of the Supreme 
Court's assumption (e.g., Apodaca. Cooper and Madden v. Oregon. 1972; 
Johnson v. Louisiana. 1972) that a majority would not stop discussion 
and outvote a minority as long as the minority had persuasive reasons 
to support their arguments. (Nemeth (1981) noted the irony of that 
assumption, given that the Court was split 5 to 4 in those decisions. 
The minority Justices obviously felt that they had persuasive reasons 
to argue against majority decision rules, which they expressed in 
dissenting opinions.)
A third concern is the effects of decision rules on how confident 
society is that justice has been done. The concern here is that
14
justice must not only be preserved, but the perception of justice must 
be protected as well. In this sense, a majority decision rule would 
be considered harmful if it eroded public confidence in the judicial 
system, even if empirical data showed that no differences were found 
between decision rules. To exemplify the potential for negative 
social perceptions of a majority decision rule, Nemeth (1981) used the 
hypothetical example of a 9 to 3 split on convicting a black 
defendant, where the majority jurors were white and the dissenting 
jurors were black.
Confidence and satisfaction with the group decision can vary with 
decision rule even for the decision makers (Kerr, Atkin, Stasser,
Meek, Holt, & Davis, 1976; Nemeth, 1977). Unanimity group members 
believe that justice is better served than those who deliberate under 
a majority decision rule. Minorities in the 2/3 majority rule groups 
are the most dissatisfied. Although it is not clear whether this 
effect can be generalized to the community, it is still of importance 
that those who participate as decision makers in the judicial system 
believe that the process is fair.
One explanation for the differences between unanimity and 
majority decision rules is that decision rule may affect group 
interdependence. Unanimity decision rule groups may be more likely to 
perceive themselves as working towards a goal than groups who are not 
required to reach unanimity. Studies on interdependence of groups and 
majority influence have usually found that interdependent groups are 
more conforming than independent ones. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) told 
subjects in an interdependent condition that the five groups which 
made the fewest errors would receive a valued reward. More
15
conformity was found in the interdependent groups than in the 
independent groups. This effect was so strong, in fact, that the 
subjects were conforming to the incorrect judgments of confederates, 
even though winning was contingent on being one of the five most 
accurate groups.
Much of the controversy on decision rules has focused on their 
effect on verdicts in murder and rape cases (e.g., Nemeth, 1977). 
Considerably less attention has been paid to the effect of decision 
rule on the outcome of civil cases. It is not known to what extent 
findings from cases where a defendant stands to lose either life or 
liberty can be generalized to cases where the jury is asked to assess 
liability or to make monetary awards. This issue is important for a 
society whose court system is unable to meet the increasing demands 
placed upon it. If it could be demonstrated that there was no 
difference in outcome due to decision rule, and outcomes could be 
reached more quickly (and therefore less expensively) by a majority 
rule, then one solution to the over-crowded court system could be to 
allow majority decision rule for civil cases, reserving the more 
costly unanimity rule for criminal cases. On the other hand, such an 
innovation would be inadvisable if it were found that the perception 
of justice was negatively affected by use of a majority rule. To 
date, the implications of different decision rules for civil cases 
have not been addressed.
The present study involved a mock-jury deliberation of a civil 
negligence case, where the jurors were required to determine a 
monetary award. This decision task, originated by Nemeth and Wachtler 
(1974), has also been used by Arbuthnot and Wayner (1982), and Wolf
16
(1985). None of these studies addressed the issue of decision rule. 
Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) used a unanimity rule for all experimental 
conditions, and found that the minority individual was successful in 
influencing the majority only when he chose the head seat at the 
deliberation table (as opposed to being assigned to it, or sitting in 
a side seat). Nemeth and Wachtler believed that the limited minority 
influence was due to the extremity of the minority's opinion 
(discussed in more detail below). The case was chosen for this study 
for its suitability as a civil case where the decision rule could be 
manipulated easily, and for the potential to generalize to other 
studies which have used the same case. The latter reason seemed 
particularly compelling in an area where so little research has been 
published. The mock-juries were composed of a minority individual 
(who was a confederate) and a majority of four or five naive subjects.
Following from Nemeth's (1977) findings, it was expected that a 
minority would be more influential under a unanimity decision rule 
than under a majority decision rule. Under majority rule group 
members would be less motivated to listen to the minority's arguments 
when it was possible for them to reach an acceptable verdict without 
the minority's approval.
Further, it was expected that the majority group members would be 
more satisfied with the group discussion under a unanimous decision 
rule than under a non-unanimous decision rule. This was expected even 
though the minority (confederate) would not conform to the group's 
position, and would probably result in the group being unable to reach 
a unanimous decision in the time allowed. Kerr et al (1976) and
17
Nemeth (1977) found that unanimity group members had a stronger sense 
of serving justice than did majority decision rule group members.
Discrepancy from the group. The effect of extremity of position 
on influence has not been clearly established. Tudderiham (1961) found 
that increased discrepancy between false group consensus and control 
group consensus produced increased conformity. In contrast,
Whittacker (1964) found a curvilinear relationship in an autokinetic 
effect study. Moderately discrepant norms produced more change than 
those that were largely or slightly discrepant. Inconsistent results 
have been found by other research involving norm extremity and 
objective stimuli (e.g., Asch, 1956; Olmstead & Blake, 1955; Schroder 
& Hunt, 1958). Goldberg (1954) suggested that subjects working with 
objective stimuli begin to suspect the experimental procedure when the 
norm is too extreme.
Objective reality is not as clear-cut when dealing with opinion 
issues, however. Helson, Blake, and Mouton (1958) found that 
conformity on opinion items increased with extremeness of the norm and 
then reached a plateau, a finding inconsistent with research on 
minority influence which has shown that the group prefers to reject 
the deviate when possible (e.g., Asch, 1952; Moscovici & Faucheax, 
1972; Nemeth, Swedlund, & Kanki, 1974; Schachter, 1951). Groups might 
dismiss individuals who take extreme positions if they can interpret 
their actions as being due to some idiosyncratic difference, such as 
being generally unreasonable.
A study by Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) is relevant. They found 
that an individual only exerted influence when he chose to sit in the 
head seat; confederates who were assigned to the head seat, or who
18
either chose or were assigned to a side seat, exerted no minority 
influence. They interpreted their results as indicating that the 
majority perceived the confederate who chose the head seat as very 
confident, and this led to the ability to influence the group. The 
lack of any minority influence in the other conditions was surprising, 
however, considering the findings from other studies. Nemeth and 
Wachtler suggested that minority influence might have occurred in all 
conditions if the minority position had been less extreme. This seems 
likely, given the emotional nature of the experimental discussion 
sessions, as reported by Nemeth and Wachtler. Since the present study 
used the same case, this point will be elaborated.
Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) noted that the naive subjects were 
very committed to their position. The groups' task was to reach an 
unanimous decision on how much money to award a washing machine 
repairman who broke his leg at a customer's home due to the customer's 
negligence. His insurance had reimbursed him for wage losses and 
hospitalization, but he was suing for "the past and present pain and 
suffering and the worry and grief which he has undergone as a result 
of this accident." The average initial judgment by the subjects was 
$14,670, with no one giving less than $8,000. The confederate’s 
position was that the repairman should only get $3,000. Nemeth and
Wachtler reported that subjects were abusive to the confederates, even
to the point where one subject offered to break the confederate's leg
after the session " to demonstrate the pain and suffering of such an
injury" (p. 69). Thus, unlike subjects in other studies who were 
asked to identify color slides, subjects in this experiment were 
vehement in maintaining their positions. It is noteworthy that the
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minority exerted influence in any condition, considering how much the 
group members disliked the confederate.
Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) suggested that minority influence 
might have occurred (in varying degrees) in all the experimental 
conditions if the minority position had been less extreme, i.e., if 
the confederate had chosen an amount closer to the majority's 
position. Given the inconclusive nature of the research that exists 
on this topic, an examination of the effect of position extremity on 
minority influence is needed.
Based on previous research, it was expected that minorities who 
expressed an opinion highly discrepant from the group would be less 
influential than those minorities whose opinions were closer to the 
group norm. Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) believed that in the case used 
in the present study, the small minority influence effect which they 
found was due to the extremity of the minority's position. Further, 
majorities are more likely to reject a deviant minority when the 
minority is highly discrepant from the group norm. It was expected 
that minorities who expressed an opinion highly discrepant from the 
group norm would be judged more negatively by the group than those 
whose opinions were closer to the group norm.
Sex Differences
Sex differences in exerting influence. A review by Eagly (1978) 
of the persuasion research (i.e., where individuals stated their 
positions and provided supporting arguments) and conformity research 
(i.e., where the opinion of a source person is given without 
supporting arguments) indicates that the existing literature on sex 
differences in exerting influence shows a very inconsistent pattern.
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Although many of the studies found no effect of communicator sex 
(e.g., Johnson & MacDonnell, 1974; Meyers & Arenson, 1968; Miller & 
McReynolds, 1973), other studies found sex differences in direct 
conflict with other published studies. For instance, Knower (1935) 
found that cross-sex combinations of influencing agent and target led 
to greater opinion change, whereas Crano (1970) found that same-sex 
combinations were more effective. Meade and Barnard (1973, 1975) 
found that males were more effective with both male and female 
targets, whereas Luchins (1955) found that females were more effective 
than males with male targets. Finally, Sistrunk and McDavid (1971) 
reported that females were more effective with female targets on 
masculine items, in contrast to Goldberg's (1975) finding that males 
were more influential on masculine items.
Eagly (1978) suggested that these conflicting results should be 
considered in light of the target's goals. Following from Deutsch and 
Gerard's (1955) distinction between informational and normative 
influence, Eagly suggested that targets who are primarily concerned 
with getting valid information may be more likely to be influenced by 
a male, given that males are generally perceived to be more competent 
than females. When the target's goal is more interpersonal, the 
relationship between the sex of the target and communicator will 
depend on the specific goal. For instance, when learning role- 
specific behavior is the goal, same-sex combinations may lead to 
greater influence, whereas when sexual attraction is seen as the 
salient goal, cross-sex combinations might lead to greater influence. 
Eagly (1978) also noted that when normative pressures are salient 
(presumably when they outweigh the need for informational validity),
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sex stereotypical behavior may occur. Studies in which there is high 
normative pressures in mixed-sex groups might show greater public 
compliance on the part of males in response to a female versus male 
communicator (i.e., following the norm of chivalry), whereas females 
who follow the norm of deferring to male authority might show more 
public compliance to males than to females. Hence, Eagly 
distinguished between the public and private influence that one might 
expect from informational influence.
In a later analysis of sex differences in social influence, Eagly 
(1983) suggested that laboratory findings of greater influence by men 
(and greater influenceability of women) were due to males' higher 
social status, even when status was controlled within the experimental 
setting. Eagly (1983) hypothesized that individuals have implicit 
theories of influence based on stereotypic sex differences that men 
are dominant and women are submissive (Eagly & Wood, 1982). Eagly 
(1983) argued that although subjects believe that men and women have 
equal influence when they have equal status (as when the equality of 
status was explicitly stated in Eagly and Wood, 1982), individuals in 
real organizations and groups have little opportunity to observe such 
equal status situations. The stereotypic implicit theory of influence 
therefore, remains unchallenged, and unaltered, by everyday 
experience, leading people to behave in ways that confirm their 
expectations (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Berger, Fisek, Norman,
& Zelditch, 1977; Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980; Meeker & 
Weitzel-O'Neill, 1977). This argument was supported by group- 
interaction studies that show an overall tendency for males to exert 
more influence than females (Brown, 1979), whereas the persuasion and
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conformity studies (where there is no group interaction) show no 
consistent male superiority in exerting influence (Eagly, 1978, 1983).
Two mock-jury studies by Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtler (1976) 
examined the nature of interaction during the deliberations, and 
potential sex differences in verdicts, persuasibility, and 
participants' perceptions of the deliberations. No differences were 
found in either study between the sexes on verdict and influence 
exerted. In the first study, in which evidence was made available in 
written form, male jurors offered more information, opinions, and 
suggestions than female jurors. Males were more likely to take the 
head seat during deliberation and were the target of more 
communications than females.
In the second study, jurors witnessed a two hour trial rather 
than receiving the evidence in written form. None of the sex 
differences found in study #1 were found in study #2. Nemeth et al 
suggested that jurors who witness a trial and do not have a written 
account of the evidence may be more likely to accept and offer 
information to recollect the facts of the case. Nemeth et al also 
proposed that jurors are more committed after witnessing a two-hour 
trial, and are less reticent about expressing their views. An 
important finding was that males in both studies were perceived as 
more influential, rational, independent, confident, strong, 
aggressive, and as more of a leader than were females, in spite of the 
lack of differences between the sexes (in the second study) on 
verdict, participation, style, or actual effectiveness. The authors 
concluded that their findings do not support the lawyers' folklore 
that women are more persuadable, submissive, dependent, and passive,
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but show that male and female participants perceive women as more 
persuadable, dependent, passive, and non-influential.
Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtlerfs (1976) study supports the notion 
of an implicit theory of stereotypic influence, but it is interesting 
that there was no sex difference for the actual influence of 
participants. Perhaps in a jury deliberation (even a mock one) the 
need for valid information in part dissipates the normative influence 
pressures, so that males and females are considered equal sources of 
input. Of course, the perception that men are more influential, even 
when they are not, points to the pervasiveness of the stereotypic 
norms.
What are the implications of these findings for minority 
influence, especially when the minority is a single individual who is 
trying to exert influence? This has been a largely overlooked issue 
in the minority influence literature. Most of the studies have used 
perceptual tasks, where there was no group interaction, and where the 
subjects and confederates were all males (e.g., Nemeth, Swedlund, & 
Kanki, 1974; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983) or all females (e.g., Nemeth, 
Wachtler, & Endicott, 1977). None of the previously cited studies by 
Moscovici or Nemeth compared the effectiveness of males and females.
Three published studies have usedisthe decision task (a mock-jury 
deliberation to determine the amount of award in a civil negligence 
case) that was employed in the present study (Arbuthnot & Wayner,
1982; Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974; Wolf, 1985). Of these, one used only 
males (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974), and one only females (Wolf, 1985, a 
simulated, not face-to-face, discussion). Only Arbuthnot and Wayner 
(1982) investigated the effect of sex of the minority source person.
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They found that there was no difference between the amount of 
influence exerted by male and female minorities. However, Arbuthnot 
and Wayner reported that female minority confederates who chose to sit 
at the head of the table (which had previously been found by Nemeth & 
Wachtler, 1974, to increase male confederates' influence) were 
considered more active (active-passive, progressive-regressive, calm- 
excitable, stable-changeable) and more potent (hard-soft, cautious- 
rash, strong-weak, severe-lenient) than were the males in the same 
condition. The authors suggested that female minorities, unlike male 
minorities, violated traditional sex role norms, and therefore they 
were perceived as more potent and active because their behavior was 
discrepant from the majority's expectations.
Arbuthnot and Wayner reported that the female minority 
confederates were not liked less (or more) than males, in spite of 
their non-traditional behavior, and concluded that women in real-life 
problem-solving group situations should not be afraid to assume an 
active role, but that they should not expect to exert more influence 
in proportion to their more active role (as compared to men). 
Arbuthnot and Wayner noted that "apparently, as is unfortunately 
typical in such situations, the female needs to exhibit more of a 
given attribute that the male in order to achieve the same outcome"
(p. 293). Certainly that sentiment is supported by their findings 
that in the control condition (that is, where no minority influence 
attempts were made by confederates), women at the head of the table 
were perceived as less able to lead the group and as having guided the 
discussion less than males in the same condition. Arbuthnot and 
Wayner suggested that only the more assertive women (i.e., the female
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confederates who supported a minority opinion) were able to overcome 
the stereotypic, negative evaluation. The findings from this study 
are certainly provocative, but since it is the only study of its type, 
replication is warranted. Further, the authors did not examine the 
relative persuasibility of the male and female subjects.
Sex differences in influenceability. Considerably more research 
has been done on sex differences in persuasibility than on sex 
differences in exerting influence. In general, this research has 
found that women are more persuasible than men, although the effect 
size is generally small, and women are more conforming than men in 
group pressure situations, especially when under the surveillance of 
the influence source (Cooper, 1979; Eagly, 1983; Eagly & Carli, 1981).
In a review of 47 studies published between 1958 and 1974, 
Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) concluded that although there were 
inconsistent findings of sex differences in influenceability, the 
overall tendency was for no difference, except that women tend to be 
more conforming in face-to-face situations which require open 
disagreement with others (i.e., as in the Asch design).
Eagly (1978) supported these conclusions in her more extensive 
review of the literature on persuasion and conformity. Of the 62 
persuasion studies reviewed, Eagly found that 51 (82%) showed no sex 
difference, with only 10 (16%) reporting significant greater female 
persuasibility. In 22 conformity studies not involving group 
pressure, 86% showed no difference, and 9% showed greater female 
conformity. In 61 studies of group pressure conformity, 62% found no 
difference, and 34% reported significantly greater conformity among 
females. Eagly concluded that the usual finding was for no
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difference, but that a substantial minority of studies demonstrated 
greater female conformity in group pressure situations. She suggested 
that this latter trend reflected women's desire to promote harmony and 
positive social relationships in group settings, rather than any real 
change in their private opinions.
Two meta-analyses have been performed on sex differences in 
influenceability. Cooper (1979) analyzed 38 of the 47 studies 
reviewed earlier by Maccoby and Jacklin (1974). Unlike previous 
reviewers, Cooper concluded that there was sufficient evidence to 
indicate greater conformity of women, with 89 uncovered studies being 
needed to reverse that conclusion. Cooper (1979) agreed with Maccoby 
and Jacklin that women conform more than males in face-to-face 
settings, but disagreed by concluding that there was consistency in 
these findings. Finally, Cooper agreed with Maccoby and Jacklin that 
the reviewed studies of persuasion experiments and conformity 
experiments using fictitious group norms showed no differences.
In a more recent meta-analysis, Eagly and Carli (1981) criticized 
Cooper's (1979) sample by pointing out that his conclusion that women 
are more conforming than men was based on retrieved quantitative 
information from only 18 studies, and the null findings for persuasion 
studies and studies using fictitious group norms were based on 
retrieved data from 2 and 4 studies, respectively. Eagly and Carli's 
(1981) meta-analysis was conducted on 61 persuasion studies, 64 
conformity studies involving group pressure, and 23 conformity studies 
not involving group pressure. The studies all had subjects of high 
school age or older, and appeared in psychology journals between 1949 
and 1977. The results showed an overall tendency, in all three
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categories, for women to be more conforming than men. When analyzed 
by year of publication, however, it was found that earlier studies 
were more likely to find greater female influenceability, supporting 
Eagly's (1978) earlier suggestion that social changes were modifying 
this tendency. The authors also examined the magnitude of the sex 
difference, and found the mean effect to be between .16 (which was the 
value obtained by including studies assumed to have no sex effect) and 
.26 (found by including only studies which gave effect size 
estimates). Eagly and Carli (1981) pointed out that Cohen (1977) 
suggested that .20 indicates a small effect and .50 a medium effect, 
so they interpreted the entire sample as demonstrating a small sex 
difference in influenceability.
Eagly and Carli (1981) also contrasted the mean effect size of 
group pressure experiments with persuasion studies and other 
conformity studies not involving group pressure, in order to determine 
support for the previously suggested (Cooper, 1979; Eagly, 1978; 
Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974) tendency for women to be more conforming in 
that situation. They found that the group pressure mean effect size 
was larger than that for the persuasion studies, but not for other 
types of conformity studies. However, the authors considered those 
findings only suggestive, in part due to the low sample size of the 
non-group pressure studies. Later work by Eagly (1983; Eagly, Wood, & 
Fishbaugh, 1981) supported the notion that women are more conforming 
than men in mixed-sex group pressure situations which involve 
surveillance by the influencing agent.
In summary, then, in the traditional majority-influence 
literature a consistent, but small, effect for greater conformity of
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women is found, especially in group pressure situations where the 
subjects are observed by the influence source.
What has not been addressed is whether or not there is a sex 
difference in influenceability in the minority influence paradigm.
That is, will women be somewhat more influenced than men by a minority 
source? Perhaps of even greater interest is the question of a 
possible interaction between sex of minority and sex of group member. 
Eagly (1978) suggested that men, following the norm of chivalry, might 
publicly agree with a woman, and that women, following the norm of 
deferring to a man, might publicly agree with a man. The underlying 
basis for this supposition (i.e., public adherence to social norms) 
leaves the possibility that the expressed public opinions might be 
different from private opinions.
In contrast, it has also been suggested that male sources have 
more credibility (Eagly, 1978). This suggests that a male minority 
would have more influence with male and female group members alike. 
Since this second suggestion is based on the concept of informational 
influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955), there should be no differences in 
public and private opinions. Although Arbuthnot and Wayner (1982) 
examined the effect of male and female minorities (as discussed in the 
previous section on sex differences in influenceability), they did not 
report on any sex differences in influenceability, nor did they 
consider any interaction effects. Clearly such an examination is 
needed.
Previous research suggests that there should be no sex effects 
for influence of the minority person. Although the literature shows 
support for an overall tendency for males to be more influential than
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females, previous research using mock jury deliberations (i.e.,
Nemeth, Endicott, & Wachtler, 1976; Arbuthnot & Wayner, 1982) found no 
differences for males and females in amount of influence exerted.
This lack of a sex effect may be due to informational needs, rather 
than normative concerns, being more salient in a mock jury discussion.
Further, previous research suggests that female minorities are 
considered less influential than male minorities. Although no sex 
differences are hypothesized for actual amount of influence exerted, 
it is expected that the female minority should be perceived as less 
influential than the male minority, consistent with previous findings 
(Nemeth, Endicott, & Wachtler, 1976).
Finally, female group members should be more influenced by the 
minority than should male group members, although the effect size 
should be small. Recent reviews (Eagly & Carli, 1981; Eagly, 1983; 
Eagly, Wood, 6c Fishbaugh, 1981) concluded that women are more 
influenceable than men, particularly in the type of experimental 
setting used in the present study (i.e., mixed-sex group pressure 
situation involving surveillance by the influence agent). The effect 
size, however, was found to be small. Further, the trend of less 
persuasibility of women in more recent studies (Eagly 6c Carli, 1981) 
should contribute to the small effect size.
In summary, the current study examined the effects of decision 
rule, minority discrepancy, minority sex, and group-member sex on the 
minority's ability to influence group members in a mock-jury 
deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case. The 
mixed-sex groups deliberated under either a unanimous or majority 
decision rule, and were composed of 4 or 5 naive group members and a
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confederate (either male or female), who expressed a minority opinion 
that was either high or low in discrepancy from the other group 
members. It was expected that minorities would be more influential 
when they were not highly discrepant from the group norm, and when the 
group was deliberating under a unanimous decision rule. It was 
expected that female minorities would be considered less influential 
than their male counterparts, although equally influential. It also 
was expected that female group members would be more influenceable 
than male group members.
CHAPTER II 
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 110 students (53 females and 57 males) from 
introductory psychology classes at the College of William and Mary in 
Virginia. These individuals, who volunteered to participate in a 
study described as "a research project on the decision-making process 
of a group", were chosen from a slightly larger group who completed 
the first phase of the experiment, as described in the next section. 
Procedure
Volunteers were scheduled for experimental sessions such that one 
to three deliberation groups could be conducted simultaneously. Upon 
arrival, participants and confederates were read a description of the 
experiment (see Appendix A for full instructions) and were assigned an 
identification number that was used for encoding all data. Each 
person was given a copy of the case history of a Robert Smith (see 
Appendix B) . Mr. Smith was a washing-machine repairman who was 
injured at a customer's house and who was suing the homeowner, Mr. 
Davis, for "the past and present pain and suffering and the worry and 
grief which he has undergone as a result of this accident" and "the 
irrevocable loss to him of an important aspect of his life, his 
ability to participate in the game of bowling." The case history 
stated "it was established during the course of the trial that Mr. 
Davis and his insurance company are indeed responsible to Mr. Smith
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and should indeed reimburse him for his losses." This amount would be 
in addition to the amount Mr. Smith's insurance company had paid, and 
would continue to pay, for his hospital bills and loss of wages.
After reading this case summary, participants completed a 
questionnaire (see Appendix C) which asked for the amount they thought
Mr. Smith should receive, as well as the highest and lowest amounts 
they would be willing to agree to "for the sake of a group agreement." 
As the volunteers completed reading the case history and answering the 
questionnaire, their written responses were collected. Individuals 
who gave an answer less than $9000 in response to the first question 
were eliminated from the experiment, but were not told this until the 
other participants had adjourned to separate deliberation rooms. This
resulted in a very small proportion of the larger sample being 
excluded. Those who met the requirement (i.e., whose answer to the 
first question was equal to or greater than $9000) were assigned to 
groups such that there were approximately equal numbers of men and 
women in each group (16 of the 24 groups had three men and three 
women, including the confederates). Groups consisted of one 
confederate and four or five naive subjects. Identification numbers 
were called to designate juries, and participants were asked whether 
they knew any of their fellow jurors. There were only a few 
affirmatives, and substitutions were made. Students who only knew 
each other only by sight were allowed to remain in the same group, but 
even this was infrequent.
Jurors were led to a deliberation room and sat around a six-sided 
table, so there were no head or side positions. Confederates had been
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instructed previously to sit in a different seat each time without 
drawing attention to their seating preference.
According to the decision rule to be employed (either unanimous 
or non-unanimous), the experimenter read the instructions and left the 
jurors to discuss the case for thirty minutes (see Appendix D for 
complete instructions). Although no specific rule (e.g., 2/3 
majority) was given in the non-unanimous condition, a majority rule 
was implicit, given the expectations of jury deliberation and the 
experimenter's instruction that they did not have to reach a unanimous 
decision. During the discussion period the confederate initially 
expressed one of two discrepancy positions: Mr. Smith should receive
only $3000 (high discrepancy) or Mr. Smith should receive only $7000 
(low discrepancy). At some point 5 to 10 minutes into the discussion, 
the confederate increased his/her initial amount by $1000, in order to 
demonstrate some flexibility and to reduce the likelihood that the 
group would become suspicious. The confederates defended their 
position with memorized arguments (see Appendix E). They were allowed 
to paraphrase these arguments in response to questions, but not to 
elaborate or give other reasons for their position.
At the end of the discussion interval the experimenter returned 
and asked each juror for his/her final (public) vote on the amount Mr. 
Smith should receive. Participants' identification number, group 
number, and final public vote were noted on a questionnaire booklet 
(Appendix F), which was then given to the individual. This 
questionnaire asked for their final personal opinion of how much Mr. 
Smith should be awarded, since "in the interest of reaching a 
compromise in the group you may have agreed to an amount greater or
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lesser than the amount you really think Mr. Smith should receive." 
Other measures were included to ascertain the individual's 
satisfaction with the group discussion and outcome, topic importance, 
and perceived similarity to other group members. Then each 
participant rated each group member on 17 characteristics:
Consistency, independence, level of activity, cooperativeness, 
centrality to the discussion, warmth, strength of will, 
perceptiveness, leadership, fairness, confidence, reasonableness, 
ability to make the participant reassess his/her opinion, likeability, 
admirability, similarity to the participant in life philosophy, and 
similarity to the participant in philosophy on the specific case.
After all booklets were completed and collected, an extensive 
debriefing session was held. No subject expressed any suspicions of 
the confederate, even when asked whether they had any doubts about the 
sincerity of any of their fellow jurors. However, one male 
participant responded that at one point early in the discussion 
session he had wondered whether or not another juror (not a 
confederate) was "working with" the experimenter. Even when told that 
there was a confederate in the group, the participants were still 
unable to identify him/her. That the participants were genuinely 
involved with the discussion topic was demonstrated by the fact that 
in almost all cases, the jurors' initial response to having the 
confederate identified was to ask for his/her real opinion on the 
case. The rationale for the study and the necessity of having a 
confederate was explained.
To summarize, mixed groups consisting of four or five 
participants and one male or female confederate deliberated for 30
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minutes on the amount which should be awarded to a Mr. Smith for "the 
pain and suffering" incurred as a result of an accident (i.e., the 
dependent variable). The confederate maintained either a high- 
discrepancy position ($3000 - $4000) or a low-discrepancy position 
($7000 - $8000) from the group members, all of whom initially wanted 
to award an amount between $9000 and $35,000. The final manipulated 
variable was decision rule (unanimous or non-unanimous). The 
resulting experimental design was a 2 (male-female subject sex) X 2 
(male-female minority/confederate sex) X 2 (unanimous-nonunanimous 
decision rule) X 2 (high-low discrepancy) between subjects factorial 
design.
Data Analyses
The dependent measures fall into two categories: monetary awards
and perceptions of group members. The monetary measures were analyzed 
with 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 (Sex of Majority X Sex of Minority X Discrepancy 
from Group X Decision Rule) Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs) with 
repeated measures for initial and final public awards. The 17 
perception variables were analyzed with 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVAs (Sex of 
Majority X Sex of Minority X Discrepancy from Group X Decision Rule), 
with repeated measures of two scores: (1) the individual's rating of 
the confederate on the variable and (2) the mean of that individual's 
ratings of the other majority members on that variable. That is, the 
person's perceptions of the minority were compared with that person's 
average perception of the other group members. For all 17 variables, 
a score of 1 denoted that the variable applied not at all to the ratee 
and 9 indicated that the variable applied very much.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
An analysis to determine whether the initial final public 
judgments were different from the final private judgments 
demonstrated that the mean final public award ($16,795) was not 
significantly different from the mean final private award ($17,177), 
F(l,94) - 2.5, p > .10. In the interest of brevity, only analyses 
with the final public judgment are reported, as the pattern for the 
final private judgments are virtually identical.
Participants were asked whether they (or relatives or close 
friends) had ever been involved in a similar accident, as it seemed 
possible that one's views could be influenced by personal exposure to 
such a case. Of the 110 participants, only 17 indicated that they, or 
someone they knew, had been involved in a similar situation. An 
analysis performed on the change from initial judgment to final public 
judgment with involvement as the only independent variable showed no 
significant difference as a result of involvement, F(1,108) - 1.10, p 
> .29.
The importance of the topic to the participant was used as a 
covariate i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  ANOVA for initial and final public 
judgments. The covariate was not significant, F(l,93) - 1.8, p > .17, 
indicating that the results were not influenced by the subject's 
assessment of the topic's importance.
36
37
General Findings
The monetary data were first analyzed to determine whether there 
was a significant decrease in final judgment from the initial award 
judgment. The 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA with repeated measures for initial 
and final private judgments showed an overall decrease, £(1,94) —
34.5, £ < .01, with the mean initial award ($21,636) significantly 
different from the mean final judgment ($17,177). However, given the 
lack of appropriate control condition, it cannot be determined 
definitely that minority influence is the explanation for this effect. 
Alternate explanations, such as regression to the mean, cannot be 
ruled out.
The perceptual data, which contrasted each group member's 
perceptions of the minority with his/her averaged perceptions of the 
other group members, are summarized in Table 1. The data showed that, 
overall, group majority members, when compared to the minority, were 
considered more cooperative, F(l,94) - 133.6, |> < .01, more 
perceptive, £(1,94) - 10.7, j> < .01, more reasonable, £(1,94) - 75.3,
E < .01, more likeable, £(1,94) - 8.2, e fs -01, more similar to the 
subject in life philosophy, £(1,94) — 12.0, e  ^ -01), more similar to 
the subject on the discussed case, F(l,94) - 48.8, e  ^ *01, warmer,
F(1,94) - 13.1, £ < -01, and fairer, £(1.94) - 63.3, e  < -01.
On the other hand, the minority confederate, as compared to the 
other group members, was considered to be more consistent, £(1,94) « 
41.1, e  ^ -01, more confident, £(1,94) - 14.4, e  ^ *01, more of a 
leader, £(1,94) - 7.6, e ^ -01, more independent, £(1,94) — 133.6, e ^ 
.01, more central to the discussion, £(1,94) -* 23.8, e  ^ .01), more
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strong-willed, F(l,94) - 142.9, |> < .01, and more active, F(l,94) —
68.5, p < .01.
In addition, minorities were seen as making individuals reassess 
their opinions more than other group members, F(l,94) — 3.5, £ — .06. 
There was no difference between minority and majority group members on 
only one of the 17 perception variables. No difference was seen 
between the minorities and the other group members in terms of how 
admirable they were, F(l,94) - .61, p > .43.
Decision Rule and Discrepancy Effects
The analysis of the change from initial to final public award 
yielded an interaction between decision rule and discrepancy that 
approached accepted levels of significance, F(l,94) - 3.58, p — .06.
As can be seen in Table 2, the greatest changes from initial to final 
award occurred in the unanimous, low discrepancy and the non- 
unanimous, high discrepancy conditions, while the least change 
occurred in the non-unanimous, low discrepancy condition. This same 
pattern was repeated in the analysis of change from initial to final 
private award, where the decision rule X discrepancy interaction was 
significant, £(1,94) - 6.02, p < .05.
As shown in Table 3, two of the 17 perception variables 
demonstrated a decision rule effect for repeated measures on 
perceptions of minority and majority group members. The minority was 
considered more consistent than the majority F(l,94) — 8.67, p < .01, 
and less cooperative F(l,94) — 7.15, p < .01 in the unanimous than in 
the non-unanimous condition.
Two significant effects were found for the discrepancy variable, 
shown in Table 4. The minority in the low discrepancy condition was
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liked less, F(l,94) - 4.67, £ < .05, and was seen as less like the 
subjects in life philosophy, F(l,94) - 4.33, £ < .05, than the high- 
discrepancy minority.
Two significant two-way interactions were found for decision 
rule and discrepancy, depicted in Table 5. Subjects saw the greatest 
difference between majority members and the minority's cooperativeness 
in the unanimous, low discrepancy condition, £(1,94) — 4.50, £ < .05. 
In the low discrepancy condition, the minority was considered more 
confident than the majority when a unanimous decision rule rather than 
a non-unanimous one was used, whereas the reverse was true in the high 
discrepancy condition, F(l,94) — 11.17, £ < .01.
Three two-way interactions were found for Sex of Minority and 
Decision Rule, shown in Table 6. Female minorities in the unanimous 
condition were considered as strong-willed as male minorities when 
compared to majority members, whereas females in the non-unanimous 
condition were not, F(l,94) - 4.98, £ < .05. The greater difference 
between the perception of the minority and majority in terms of 
leadership occurred in the unanimous condition for male minorities, 
whereas the least difference occurred for female minorities in the 
non-unanimous condition, F(l,94) — 4.78, £ < .05. The least 
difference in perceived fairness occurred in the unanimous condition 
for male minorities, and the greatest difference for female minorities 
under that same decision rule, F(l,94) — 5.21, £ < .05.
In summary, these three interactions indicate that female 
minorities are particularly negatively evaluated in terms of their 
leadership and strength of will under a non-unanimous decision rule. 
Male minorities, on the other hand, are especially perceived as
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leaders under a unanimous decision rule. Finally, in marked contrast 
to male minorities, female minorities are judged as unfair under a 
unanimous decision rule.
Finally, group members in the non-unanimous condition were more 
satisfied with the group discussion (M - 7.06) than those in the 
unanimous condition (M — 6.36), F(l,94) — 4.10, 2 < .05. Those in the 
non-unanimous condition were also more satisfied with the group's 
final decision (M — 5.69) than those in the unanimous condition (M — 
4.60), F(1,94) - 6.55, 2 < -05.
Sex Differences
There were no sex effects for any of the monetary measures, 
indicating that (1) there were no significant differences in amount 
of minority influence due to the sex of the minority, and (2) male 
and female group members were not differentially influenced.
Seven of the 17 perception measures yielded main effects for 
sex of minority, and these effects demonstrate a consistent pattern:
On five variables male minorities were assessed more positively than 
other group members or than female minorities, whereas female 
confederates were rated less favorably than male minorities or other 
group members on two variables. As Table 7 shows, male minorities 
were considered more of a leader, F(l,94) - 15.64, 2 < .01, more 
active, F(l,94) — 7.0, 2 ^ .01, central to the discussion F(l,94) — 
4.62, 2 ^ *05, more confident, F(l,94) - 4.45, ]> < .05, and were 
credited more with making the subjects reassess their opinions,
F(l,94) - 12.58, 2 ^ -01. Female minorities, as compared to male 
minorities and majority group members, were considered least
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perceptive, F(l,94) - 5.21, p < .05, and least fair, F(l,94) - 7.14, p 
< .01).
There were no main effects for sex of majority group member, 
however, there were two significant two-way interactions (with 
repeated measures on perceptions of minority versus majority group 
members) between sex of minority and majority (see Table 8). Male and 
female majority members felt that a male minority, when compared to 
the majority, made them reassess their opinions, with this effect 
being especially pronounced for the female majority members, who also 
indicated that a female minority was less influential in this regard 
than other group members, F(l,94) - 3.86, p < .05. Male majority 
members found male minority members to be very admirable, compared to 
the overall group, whereas female majority members saw little 
difference, E(l,94) — 3.80, p < .05. However, (and, again, unlike the 
male majority), the female majority considered the female minority 
less admirable than the other group members. The overall pattern 
indicates that male minorities were positively evaluated by males and 
females alike, whereas female group members were particularly 
censorious of female minorities.
Finally, group members with a male minority were more satisfied 
with the group discussion (M — 7.05) than those with a female minority 
(M - 6.37), F(1,94) - 3.84, p < .05.
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The present study examined the effects of decision rule (i.e., 
unanimous or non-unanimous), minority-majority discrepancy, minority 
sex, and majority group member sex on the minority's ability to 
influence group members. The experimental setting was a mock-jury 
deliberation of a monetary award in a civil negligence case. The 
results showed that a minority's influence is related to the 
interactive effects of decision rule and minority's discrepancy from 
the majority. Consistent with previous findings, the minority group 
member was considered less likeable, but was more influential, than 
other group members. Although group members were influenced equally 
by male and female minorities (as measured by the change in initial to 
final compensatory judgments), group members of both sexes perceived 
the female minority as less influential than the male minority. 
Monetary Measures
Previous research has suggested that minorities are more 
influential under a unanimous decision rule, and when they are not 
very discrepant from the majority. Law scholars and other individuals 
concerned with civil liberties have argued that majority rule weakens 
the judicial system by allowing jurors to disregard dissenting, and 
possibly valid, opinions. Social influence researchers have found 
that minorities who express opinions that are in strong contrast to
42
43
those of the majority are usually ostracized and dismissed as 
deviates.
The present study, however, failed to find these simple effects 
on a minority's ability to exert influence. Instead, decision rule 
and minority-majority discrepancy interacted, such that minority 
influence was greatest under the combined conditions of a unanimous 
decision rule and low minority-majority discrepancy, and least under a 
non-unanimous decision rule and low discrepancy. That is, the groups 
with the greatest and least amount of change differed only on the 
decision rule. High discrepancy, regardless of decision rule, was 
associated with intermediate levels of minority influence.
Apparently, the minority stating a low discrepancy opinion is 
tolerated, but is relatively ineffectual in the absence of pressure to 
reach a unanimous decision. Conversely, when individuals are 
instructed to reach a unanimous decision, a low discrepant minority is 
the most influential, perhaps because the minority is close enough to 
the majority opinion to avoid being dismissed as a deviate. Whereas 
in the non-unanimous condition the Majority may simply accept the 
minority's view without feeling any external pressure to modify their 
own opinion, under a unanimous decision rule the majority is faced 
with one "hold out" who really isn't that different from the group.
It appears from this study that jurors who are in mild 
disagreement are far more likely to be influenced by a minority when 
they are deliberating under a unanimous decision rule, while it is 
easier to agree to disagree under a majority rule. On the other hand, 
greater disagreement seems to lead to an intermediate level of 
influence by the minority regardless of decision rule. The level of
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disagreement is sufficient in itself to generate discussion, argument 
and modification of opinions.
The current study used a civil case rather than a criminal case. 
It seems likely that civil cases, at least where the deliberation 
concern monetary awards, are more likely than criminal cases to have 
minorities who disagree with the majority only mildly. Criminal 
cases, where a forced-choice decision is required, are more likely to 
be characterized by high levels of discrepancy (i.e., guilty or 
innocent) between minorities and majorities. The implication is that 
a unanimous decision rule may actually have a greater effect on 
minority influence in civil cases than in criminal ones, but only in 
situations where there isn't too much difference between the jurors 
anyway. Given the costs associated with the judicial system, it may 
be that unanimity decision rules are not cost effective for civil 
cases. Further, given that minority influence is not affected by 
decision rule when there is high discrepancy, it may be that unanimous 
decision rules are less necessary in criminal cases than previously 
thought. Obviously these findings are only suggestive, but they do 
indicate that future research should consider a more complex interplay 
of factors, rather than a narrow focus on only one variable affecting 
the issue.
Implications for the legal literature need to be qualified, 
given that no explicit majority rule was stated for the non-unanimous 
groups. Subjects were only told that they were not required to reach 
a unanimous decision. Given conventional knowledge of jury 
deliberations, it seems reasonable to assume that the participants 
were operating under an implicit majority rule. Future research,
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however, should indicate an explicit majority rule (e.g., a 2/3 
majority rule).
Contrary to findings by Nemeth (1977), members of the unanimous 
decision groups were less satisfied than non-unanimous group members 
with the group's final decision. Nemeth found, however, that 
unanimous decision group members were less comfortable during the 
discussion. Indeed, in the present study those under the unanimous 
rule were less satisfied with the group's discussion than those under 
the non-unanimous rule. Why only a partial replication of Nemeth's 
findings? Possibly because no unanimous-rule groups ever reached a 
unanimous decision, unlike Nemeth's groups which deliberated until 
they reached consensus. In the present study, the unanimous decision 
rule groups failed to reach their goal, whereas non-unanimous rule 
groups had no external goal imposed on them at all. Hence, it seems 
reasonable that those in the unanimous decision rule groups would 
indeed be less satisfied with both the discussion and the group's 
final decision.
Previous research (e.g., Brown, 1979) has found a general 
tendency in group interactions for males to be more influential than 
females. In contrast, the literature on mock-jury deliberations 
(e.g., Nemeth et al, 1976) suggests that there should be no difference 
in the amount of influence exerted by males or females. Further, the 
single study which has looked at sex differences in minority influence 
in mock-jury deliberations (Arbuthnot & Wagner, 1982) found no 
evidence of superior male influence. The present study supported the 
previous mock-jury research, and found no difference in the ability of 
male and female minorities to influence group members.
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The present study also addressed the previously unexplored issue 
of sex differences in influenceability in response to minority 
influence attempts. Previous research (e.g., Eagly & Carli, 1981; 
Eagly et al., 1981; Eagly, 1983) has suggested that women are more 
influenced than men in group pressure situations, although the effect 
size is usually small. As with minority sex, this study found no 
difference in the influenceability of male and female majority 
members. Further, there was no interaction between sex of minority 
and sex of majority. No differences were found in public versus 
private judgments, indicating that majority members did not publicly 
follow social norms (i.e., men publicly agreeing with a woman, and 
women publicly agreeing with a man), while holding discrepant private 
opinions.
Instead, the findings support Nemeth, Endicott, and Wachtler's 
(1976) conclusion that women (at least in a mock-jury situation) are 
not really different from men in their ability to influence, nor in 
their tendency to be influenced, but are perceived by both men and 
women to be less influential and more persuadable than men. These 
normative expectations may explain, in part, the finding that the 
majority (both males and females) expressed greater satisfaction with 
the group discussion when the minority was male rather than female. 
This explanation gains credibility when the majority's perceptions of 
the minority are considered.
Perceptions of the Minority
Main effects. Earlier research (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1974) has 
shown that a minority is considered more consistent, independent, 
active, central, strong-willed, confident, more of a leader and is
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believed by the majority to have made them reassess their opinions 
more than others in the group. Further, the majority is less liked 
and considered less fair, reasonable, perspective, warm, cooperative, 
admired, and wanted than others. These findings were replicated in 
the present study. Although the main effect for "admirable" was not 
significant, an interaction between sex of minority and sex of 
majority on this variable, discussed below, accounts for this. In 
addition, the minority was considered less similar to the majority in 
the case they discussed (verifying the perception of the confederate 
as a minority), and also less similar to the majority in life 
philosophy. The latter points out an interesting generalization on 
the part of the majority. It can be seen that the main effects for 
the perceptions of the minority support previous research and 
emphasize that the minority’s influence is not dependent on how much 
they are liked, or how similar they are seen to be.
Rule and discrepancy effects. In addition to affecting the 
amount of influence exerted by the minority, decision rule and 
minority-majority discrepancy also affected the majority's assessment 
of the minority. Past research has suggested that the perception of 
consistency and confidence are important for successful minority 
influence. The present study found that a minority is considered more 
consistent under a unanimous decision rule, and that minority 
influence was at either high or intermediate levels under a unanimous 
rule. Nemeth and Wachtler (1974) found that choosing to sit at the 
head of a table apparently increases the impression of confidence, and 
leads to greater minority influence. The present study found that the 
interactive effects of minority-majority discrepancy and decision rule
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also vary the impression of the minority's confidence. Minorities 
expressing a low discrepant opinion under a unanimous decision rule, 
or a high discrepant opinion under a non-unanimous decision rule, were 
considered more confident than other group members, and exerted high 
and intermediate levels of minority influence, respectively.
These results support the previous research, and they indicate 
the particular importance of the combination of perceived consistency 
and confidence. The greatest amount of minority influence occurred in 
the unanimous, low discrepancy condition, where the minority was seen 
as both consistent and confident. Whereas in the two intermediate 
conditions only one factor was salient: The minority was considered
more confident than the majority in one case (non-unanimous, high 
discrepancy) and more consistent in the other (unanimous decision, 
high discrepancy). The least amount of minority influence occurred 
where the minority was not seen as different from the majority either 
in terms of consistency or of confidence.
The present study also verifies Nemeth and Wachtler's 
interpretation of their findings. They used confidence as an implied 
variable; that is, they had the minority person either choose or be 
assigned to the head seat at the discussion table, and they assumed 
that the majority members interpreted the choosing of the head chair 
as a sign of confidence. By allowing group members in the present 
study to rate the minority and majority members on confidence, we have 
gained verification that the majority considers the effective minority 
member more confident.
The minority who took a low discrepancy position under a 
unanimous decision rule was considered particularly uncooperative
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compared to other group members. Perhaps the group members found it 
especially frustrating that someone would refuse to go along with the 
group when there wasn't very much difference in their positions and 
there was the pressure to reach unanimity. This finding is 
interesting given that the greatest amount of minority influence 
occurred in this condition, again pointing out that minority influence 
is not dependent on positive personal attributions from the majority.
Decision rule also differentially affected perceptions of male 
and female minorities, but these findings will be considered in the 
next section.
Sex differences. Of the 17 dependent measures of majority 
perceptions of the minority versus the majority, only four 
(independence, warmth, reasonableness, and similarity to respondent in 
life philosophy) failed to have a sex of minority or sex of majority 
effect. Overall, the data support the findings of Nemeth and Wachtler 
(1974) that a female minority is viewed less favorably and considered 
less of a leader than a male minority. Majority members of both sexes 
usually agreed on their view of the female minority's inferiority.
In comparison to other group members, male minorities, more than 
female minorities, were considered more a leader, as well as more 
confident, more active, more central to the discussion, and more 
responsible for making group members reassess their opinions.
Decision rule also affected perceptions of male and female 
minorities. Male minorities under either decision rule and female 
minorities under a unanimous rule were considered stronger willed than 
the majority, whereas considerably less difference was seen between 
the group and a female minority under a non-unanimous decision rule.
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The same general pattern held for perceptions of leadership, although 
male minorities were particularly seen as more of leaders compared to 
the group under a unanimous decision rule. Finally, the least 
difference in terms of fairness between minority and majority occurred 
for male minorities under a unanimous decision rule, whereas the 
greatest difference occurred for female minorities under that same 
rule.
Arbuthnot and Wagner (1982) found that only women who chose the 
head seat and took a minority position were able to overcome negative 
stereotypic assessments of being less able to lead and to influence 
the group. They interpreted these findings as support for the notion 
that women must display "more of a given attribute than the male in 
order to achieve the same outcome" (p. 293). In the present study, 
women expressing a minority opinion under a non-unanimous decision 
rule were not seen to be leaders or strong-willed. Perhaps the non- 
unanimous decision rule, with its lack of external pressure for the 
group to reach consensus, creates a weak situation for female 
minorities, just as does a situation where the minority is unable to 
choose the head seat. That is, the lack of external pressure, in 
combination with stereotypic expectations for female behavior, may 
create a situation where the female minority's discrepant behavior can 
be more easily overlooked. The unanimous decision rule, which was 
found to increase the perception of the minority's consistency, may 
serve to emphasize the female minority's "unusual" behavior. The 
group, in effect, has to notice that she is disagreeing with them.
That female minorities are considered particularly unfair in this
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condition indicates that their behavior is not judged positively by 
the group.
This explanation of stereotypic expectations would also account 
for the enhanced perception of the male minority as a leader and as 
fair under the unanimous decision rule. The unanimous decision rule, 
by increasing the pressure on the group, may essentially serve to 
highlight the behavior of the minority. Although the majority may 
still find the minority irritating, they may grudgingly agree that the 
behavior is appropriate for males--but not for females!
When the sexes disagreed on their assessment of the minority, 
women were the ones who were more censorious of the female minority. 
Male group members considered male minorities more admirable than 
other group members, whereas there was little difference between their 
admiration for female minorities and other group members. Female 
majority members, however, expressed little difference in admiration 
for male minorities and the majority, but found a female minority less 
admirable than the rest of their group. Both male and female majority 
members felt that the male minority, in comparison to other group 
members, made them reassess their opinions, with this effect being 
particularly strong for female majority members. But whereas male 
majority members saw little difference between the group and a female 
minority, the female majority members said that a female minority was 
less able to make them reassess their opinions.
Conclusions
In summary, the present study extends previous findings and 
suggests directions for future research. Two different streams of 
research were integrated: One dealing with the effect of decision
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rules on jury deliberation and the other with the effect of minority- 
majority discrepancy on minority influence. Of interest to judicial 
scholars is the finding that the decision rule issue is influenced by 
the minority's discrepancy from the group's norm. A low-discrepancy 
minority exerted greatest influence under a unanimity decision rule, 
and least under a non-unanimity decision rule. It appears that for 
deliberations where there is relatively less disagreement between the 
minority and majority, the decision rule is critical in affecting the 
minority's ability to influence the majority. Where disagreement is 
great, however, decision rule is irrelevant, in that an intermediate 
level of minority influence occurred under both unanimity and non­
unanimity decision rules. It was suggested that civil cases (or, at 
least, the process of deciding upon monetary awards) would be more 
likely to be characterized by lesser minority-majority discrepancy, 
whereas criminal cases (which necessitate a forced choice between 
guilt and innocence) would be more likely to have greater discrepancy 
If those assumptions are valid, it follows that a unanimity decision 
rule is more important in civil than criminal cases, but only when 
there is little discrepancy between the minority and majority anyway. 
The implications for the judicial system could be very important if 
the less-costly majority decision rule could be substituted for the 
unanimous decision rule. Future research should focus on verifying 
the present findings, as well as determining whether the important 
issue of public confidence in the judicial system would be harmed by 
moving away from unanimous decision rules. Most importantly, the 
present research illustrates the need to consider how other factors
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interact with decision rules to facilitate or hinder a minority's 
ability to influence the majority.
Of interest to minority and social influence researchers is the 
finding that situational variables can affect a minority's ability to 
exert influence. Decision rule determines whether a low-discrepancy 
minority exerts considerable influence (i.e., under a unanimous rule) 
or very little (i.e., under a non-unanimous rule). Further, it was 
found that high-discrepancy minorities were not ignored by the group, 
although it should be noted that they exerted less influence (under 
both decision rules) than a low-discrepancy minority under a unanimous 
decision rule. These findings qualify previous research regarding 
rejection of a deviate (at least in relative terns), but indicating 
that it is not the amount of discrepancy alone which determines the 
minority's ability to influence the majority. In general the minority 
was evaluated less favorably than other group members, but was still 
able to exert influence.
Finally, majority group members of both sexes were influenced 
equally by male and female minorities, but in spite of this, believed 
that the female minority was less influential than the male minority. 
This finding may reflect that changes in stereotypical expectations 
lag behind behavioral changes. That is, majority members may be 
equally influenced by males and females, as in the present case, but 
their expectations may still be that they will be more influenced by a 
male. Further, their evaluations of male versus female minorities 
confirm that they more highly value "deviant” behavior in males than 
females. Argumentative males are leaders, whereas argumentative 
females are a nuisance. It seems likely that 40 years ago a study of
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this nature would have found that males were more influential, as well 
as perceived as more influential. Perhaps future research will find 
that stereotypic expectations and actual behaviors are again 
congruent, with minorities of either sex being regarded as leaders.
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TABLE 1
GENERAL FINDINGS:
CONTRASTS OF EACH GROUP MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE MINORITY 
WITH THEIR AVERAGED PERCEPTIONS OF THE OTHER GROUP MEMBERS
MEANS FQ.94)
Minority Group Majority Group
Member Member
Cooperative 4.34 6.48 133.6
Reasonable 4.82 6.58 75.3
Fair 4.99 6.56 63.3
Similar to rater on 3.54 5.80 48.8
discussed case
Warm 5.57 6.33 13.1
Similar to rater on 4.55 5.45 12.0
life philosophy
Perceptive 5.60 6.36 10.7
Likeable 6.20 6.73 8.2
Strong-willed 7.97 6.26 142.9
Independent 8.24 6.57 133.6
Active 7.74 6.58 68.5
Consistent 7.90 6.69 41.1
Central to the discussion 7.16 6.30 23.8
Confident 7.14 6.58 14.4
Leader 6.04 5.72 7.6
Made raters reassess 4.82 4.42 3.5*
their opinions
*P - .06; all other p-values < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 2
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND 
MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY ON MINORITY INFLUENCE
Minority
Minority-Majority Influence:^
Decision Rule Discrepancy Initial Final (Public) Difference F(1.94
Unanimous Low 21,531 14,875 6,656 3.58**
High 21,778 17,008 4,770
Non-unanimous Low 21,863 19,921 1,942
High 20,829 15,535 5,294
Decision Rule Discrepancy Initial Final (Private) Difference F(1.94)
Unanimous Low 21,531 15,084 6,447 6.02***
High 21,778 18,516 3,262
Non-unanimous Low 21,863 20,256 1,607
High 20,829 15,410 5,419
Repeated measures on initial versus final judgment.
**E - .06
*** . nc E < .05
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 3
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION OF DECISION RULE
Variable Decision Rule
Consistent Unanimous
Non-unanimous
Maj ority's Mean 
Perception of 
Minority Majority
8.29
7.45
6.65
6.84
Difference F(1.94^
1.64
.61
8.67
Cooperative Unanimous 4.12 6.75 -2.63 7.15**
Non-unanimous 4.85 6.33 -1.48
Repeated measures on the majority's perception of the minority vs. 
their averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 4
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A FUNCTION 
OF MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY
Variable
Liking for 
this person
Minority- 
Majority 
Discrepancy
Low
High
Majority's Mean 
Perception of 
Minority Majority
6.05
6.47
6.97
6.60
Difference F(1.94> 
,**-.92
.13
4.67
Similar to Low
rater in life 
philosophy High
4.35
4.94
5.69
5.31
-1.34
-.37
4.33**
Repeated measures on the majority's perception of the minority vs. 
their averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .05
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 5
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND 
MINORITY-MAJORITY DISCREPANCY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES
Variable
Minority- Majority's Mean 
Decision Majority Perception of
Rule Discrepancy Minority Majority Difference— F(1.94)
Unanimous Low 3.67 7.07 -3.40 4
High 4.57 5.93 -1.36
Non- Low 5.02 6.36 -1.34
unanimous High 4.67 6.31 -1.64
.50**
Confidence Unanimous Low 7.54 6.62 .92 11
High 7.02 6.73 .29
Non- Low 6.80 6.95 -.15
unanimous High 7.46 6.20 1.26
Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. their
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .05 
* * *  —j> < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 6
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF DECISION RULE AND SEX OF 
MINORITY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES
Variable
Maj or ity's Mean 
Decision Sex of Perception of
Rule Minority Minority Majority Difference
Strong-
willed
Unanimous Male
Female
8.32
8.24
6.41
6.22
1.91
2.02
Non-
unanimous
Male
Female
8.05
7.35
6.03
6.50
2.02
.85
Leader Unanimous Male
Female
7.34
6.20
5.78
5.67
1.56
.53
Non-
unanimous
Male
Female
6.24
6.04
5.60
5.97
.64
.07
Fairness Unanimous Male
Female
6.10 % 
3.88
6.90
6.49
-.80
-2.61
Non-
unanimous
Male
Female
5.31
5.27
6.43
6.53
- 1.12
-1.26
Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. 
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < .05
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
F(1.94^
4 *4*
4.98
4.78**
5.21**
their 
to the
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TABLE 7
DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES AS A 
FUNCTION OF THE SEX OF THE MINORITY
Variable
Leader
Active
Central to 
the discus 
sion
Confident
Reassess
opinion
Fair
Perceptive
Minority's 
Sex
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Maj ority's Mean 
Perception of 
Minority Majority
6.79
6.12
8.14
7.49
7.55
6.87
7.49
6.92
5.90
3.98
5.70
4.58
6.29
5.20
5.68
5.82
6.56
6.67
6.31
6.39
6.59
6.66
4.69
4.36
6.67
6.51
6.49
6.31
Difference F(1.94")
1.11 15.64***
.30
1.58
.82
1.24
.48
.90
.26
1.21
-.38
-.97
1.93
-.20
1.11
7.00•kick
4.62**
4.45**
12.58
7.14
5.21**
*
Repeated measures on perception of minority versus averaged 
perceptions of other majority members.
R < *05 
R < .01
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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TABLE 8
INTERACTIVE EFFECTS OF SEX OF MAJORITY AND 
SEX OF MINORITY ON PERCEPTUAL VARIABLES
Variable
Reassess
opinion
Sex of Sex of 
Majority Minority
Male
Female
Male
Female
Male
Female
Mean Perception of 
Minority Majority
5.50
3.78
6.31
4.19
4.60
3.59
4.78
5.13
Difference
.90
.19
1.53
-.94
F(1.94)
3.86**
Admirable Male Male
Female
7.54
6.57
6.43
6.35
1.11
.22
3.80**
Female Male
Female
6.07
5.98
5.91
6.56
.16
.58
Repeated measures on majority's perception of the minority vs. their 
averaged perception of the other majority group members.
E < • 05
Note: A score of 1 denotes that the variable applied not at all to the
ratee and 9 indicates the variable applied very much.
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTIONS
Please check your name on this list so that we’ll know who has 
participated. Note the number next to your name... This is your 
subj ect number and will be used to identify your data sheets. Make 
sure you put this number on all of your materials, except for the case 
history booklet. You have all volunteered to participate in this 
study and as volunteers you may leave the experiment at any time. Of 
course, we would prefer for you to stay, because if one person leaves, 
none of the data from that group can be used.
This is a study of group processes--particularly the group 
process of decision making. You will be asked to read a case history, 
make an initial judgment and then, as jury members, adjourn to 
deliberation rooms to discuss the case with fellow jurors. I'm going 
to give each one of you a copy of the case history now. It is very 
important, because of our paper shortage, that you not mark on these 
case history booklets. We'll be re-using them several times.
(Pass out booklets. As people being to finish, pass out 1st 
questionnaire.)
I am now handing out a very brief questionnaire. Please write 
your subject number where it says "Name.'' Do not write your name. 
When you have finished the questionnaire, I'll pick it up.
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APPENDIX B
SMITH vs. BEAUCANNON INSURANCE CO.
(District Court, Boulder, Colorado)
Action was taken by Robert Smith against the Beaucannon 
Insurance Company and Mr. Ralph Davis for recovery of damages for 
personal injuries and expenses resulting from a fall down a stairs.
On the morning of April 7, 1976, Robert Smith, age 40, arrived 
at the house of Ralph Davis in Boulder, Colorado in response to a call 
placed the day before asking him to repair a washing machine in the 
basement of the Davis' home. On arrival, he was greeted by Mrs.
Davis, who directed him to the door to the basement stairs. Since it 
was an old house recently acquired by Mr. Davis, there was no light in 
the stairway; consequently, the passage was very dark. On proceeding 
down the stairs, Mr. Smith tripped on a basket of dirty laundry that 
had been left by Mrs. Davis on the landing of the stairs. His 
consequent fall caused the injuries complained of.
During the trial Mr. Smith offered evidence to prove that his 
injuries included bruises about the face and head, a broken leg, and 
severely torn cartilage in his knee, that as a result of these and 
other injuries he received, he was unable to return to his employment 
for ten weeks, that he thereafter worked only three or four hours per 
day for eight to ten weeks more and was unable to resume full and 
normal work activities for four or five months following the accident, 
that his knee was not normal for a year in that it chronically swelled 
and pained him, that his knee does not function normally, causing him 
to walk with a slight limp, and has slipped out of joint on at least 
two occasions, causing severe pain. In fact, it was shown that only a 
week before trial his knee had dislocated while he was at work, 
causing him two days of severe pain and loss of those two days' wages. 
A doctor had stated that the cartilage would remain stretched and 
weakened and that there would always be a possibility that his knee 
would slip out of joint if sudden pressure was applied.
Mr. Smith also showed that, as the sole proprietor of and 
workman in his repair shop, his only income before the accident was 
about $225 per week, and that as proprietor he had insurance on his 
hospital costs. This same insurance paid him an adequate amount in 
loss of wages and will continue to reimburse him for future pecuniary 
losses resulting from this accident.
It was also established that Mr. Smith's sole recreation and 
enjoyment had been bowling and that he was a member of a league within 
which his finesse had caused him to have popularity and notice. Mr. 
Smith stated that the lingering pain in his leg and his uncertainty
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about whether his knee would slip out of joint now prevents him from 
bowling and will keep him from bowling ever again.
Mr. Smith is asking for 35 thousand dollars compensation (after 
lawyer's fees), which he knows to be the full amount of personal 
injury coverage (again after lawyer's fees) in Mr. Davis' insurance 
policy. This amount, he contends, is to reimburse him for the past 
and present pain and suffering and the worry and grief which he has 
undergone as a result of this accident, and, as his lawyer stated,
"the irrevocable loss to him of an important aspect of his life, his 
ability to participate in the game of bowling, or any other activity 
which may cause his knee to painfully separate."
It was established during the course of the trial that Mr. Davis 
and his insurance company are indeed responsible to Mr. Smith and 
should indeed reimburse him for his losses. However, it is left to 
you, the jury, to decide the amount of damages to be rewarded. The 
judge turns to you and instructs you that "you will consider, in 
reaching the amount of your verdict, how much you should award in 
order to fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the pain and 
suffering, worry and grief, and humiliation that has been endured and 
will hereafter be suffered. You will take all these matters into 
consideration and, using your best judgment and experience in human 
affairs, award such a sum that you consider should be awarded to 
fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the injuries received."
With that, you retire to your meeting room to decide how much 
money should be awarded to Mr. Smith.
In summary: Mr. Smith's insurance company has paid and will
continue to pay, should the need arise in the future, for Mr. Smith's
hospital bills and loss of wages resulting from this accident. Mr. 
Smith has made his case that the injury to his knee has caused him 
great pain and will prevent him from participating in active sports in 
the future, although he is capable of full time employment. He 
anticipates pain, inconvenience, and a change in his life style in the
future. It is up to you, the jury, to decide how much to give Mr.
Smith (after lawyer's fees) for the "pain and suffering, worry and 
grief, and humiliation" that he has undergone and will continue to 
undergo as a result of this accident.
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APPENDIX C 
POST-CASE QUESTIONNAIRE
A. Now that you have just read the case, we would like to have your
first impressions on how much should be given to Mr. Smith for 
his pain and suffering. Remember that $35,000 is the maximum 
amount that can be awarded.
$____________________________
Now that you have given your own opinion on what you feel Mr. Smith 
should be given, we would like you to put down what you feel would be 
the highest and lowest amounts that you could go to in order to reach 
a group agreement.
B. The highest you would go for the sake of a group agreement:
$____________________________
C. The lowest you would go for the sake of a group agreement: 
$____________________________
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APPENDIX D 
PRE-DISCUSSION SESSION INSTRUCTIONS 
[For unanimous decision]
You, as jury members, are to discuss this case and reach a 
unanimous decision as to how much should be awarded to Mr. Smith. You 
will have 1/2 hour to make your decision. Again, please do not mark 
on the case history booklets. Let me give you an idea of where the 
other jurors stand by telling you what each person here thinks Mr. 
Smith should receive.
(Do so.)
Are there any questions?
[For non-unanimous decisions]
You, as jury members, are to discuss this case and decide how 
much you each think should be awarded to Mr. Smith. You will have 1/2 
hour to discuss the case and then I will return to get your individual 
opinions. Again, please do not mark on the case history booklets.
Let me give you an idea of where the other jurors stand by telling you 
what each person here thinks Mr. Smith should receive.
(Do so.)
Are there are any questions?
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APPENDIX E 
MINORITY'S (CONFEDERATE'S) ARGUMENTS
I. I feel sorry for this guy. He has suffered a leg injury which 
is quite painful and which will be a source of aggravation and 
inconvenience for him in the future. Besides that, he'll have 
to change his life style--he won't be able to go out bowling 
with the boys anymore. I think we need to compensate him for 
these things and so I said I thought we should given him $4,000 
and let him buy something really nice for himself.
II. I think you have to consider the seriousness of a broken leg in 
comparison to how badly he might have been injured. I'm not 
saying a broken leg doesn't hurt or anything like that, but 
after all, it could have been a lot worse. I could see giving 
him $35,000 for a more serious injury.
III. I think people have a tendency to give less consideration than 
they might to how much compensation they are willing to award in 
cases like this just because some insurance company is paying 
for it. By supporting large claims you encourage other people 
to file for large claims, which means that the insurance 
companies will increase insurance premiums. Besides, just 
because an insurance company is paying for this shouldn't cause 
us to give away any more than we'd otherwise consider fair.
IV. We all have sympathy for this guy and after all he deserves it.
That's a painful injury and it's unfortunate that it happened. 
But our sympathy has to be tempered by reality. Just because we 
can award $35,000, that shouldn't interfere with an agreement on 
what's fair.
V. We can't speculate about how much this is really worth to this 
guy because nobody is going to go out and break his leg for 
$35,000 or even $50,000. But once an accident has happened who 
wouldn't want as much as they could get? The point is, this was 
an accident and accidents do happen. I don't think that we can 
necessarily say more money means more fair.
VI. There's no way we can put a dollar figure on pain because
there's no way we can measure it. All we can really do is help
Mr. Smith find something to replace his bowling. I figured it 
out that $4,000 is around $15 a week for the next five years, 
which should be plenty for him to use to find himself a new 
hobby.
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APPENDIX F 
POST-DISCUSSION QUESTIONNAIRE BOOKLET
Name
Letter
Date
Time
Amount $
We would like for you to answer some questions about the group 
discussion. As the format of some of the questions may not be 
familiar to you, here is an example to illustrate how you should 
indicate your answer.
How exciting is life at William and Mary?
Not at all exciting 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Very exciting
If you thought life at William and Mary was not at all exciting, you
would CIRCLE the 1. If you thought it was very exciting you would 
circle the 9. (Note: You do not circle the words.) If you thought
life at William and Mary was moderately dull you would circle the 3 or 
4, depending on how strongly you felt.
To make sure you understand this procedure, please circle one of the
numbers that corresponds with your opinion.
Do you have any questions?
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1. Now that you have discussed the case, we would like to have your 
final impression on how much should be given to Mr. Smith for 
his pain and suffering. In the interest of reaching a 
compromise in the group you may have agreed to an amount greater 
than or lesser than the amount you really think Mr. Smith should 
receive. We would like to know your final personal opinion of 
how much should be awarded.
$__________
2. Assume that the maximum allowable compensation had been $50,000 
instead of $35,000. How much should be given to Mr. Smith?
$__________
3. Assume the original case situation ($35,000 maximum). However, 
rather than being a jury member, you are the judge and you alone 
decide the amount of damages to award. How much would you award 
to Mr. Smith?
$.
4. How satisfied are you with the group's final decision?
Not at all satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very satisfied
5. How satisfied are you with the group discussion?
Not at all satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very satisfied
6. How important is this topic to you?
Not at all important 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Very important
7. Considering the group as a whole (excluding yourself), how 
similar are the other group members to you?
Not at all similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  Very similar
8. Have you, or has any member of your family or close friend of
yours been involved in a court action to decide how much to 
award someone who has been injured? If yes, briefly describe. 
Continue on back, if necessary.
In order to understand the group process better, we would like 
to have your perceptions of the other group members. BE SURE TO 
INDICATE (BY USING THE LETTER ASSIGNED TO THAT PERSON) WHICH GROUP 
MEMBER YOU ARE DESCRIBING.
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(Booklet included one for each group member.)
GROUP MEMBER
1. Not at all consistent 1 2  3 4 5
2. Not at all independent 1 2  3 4 5
3. Not at all active 1 2  3 4 5
4. Not at all cooperative 1 2  3 4 5
5. Not at all central to 1 2  3 4 5
the discussion
6. Not at all warm 1 2  3 4 5
7. Not at all strong- 1 2  3 4 5
willed
8. Not at all perceptive 1 2  3 4 5
9. Not at all 1 2  3 4 5
a leader
10. Not at all fair 1 2  3 4 5
11. Not at all confident 1 2  3 4 5
12. Not at all reasonable 1 2  3 4 5
13. Did not make me 1 2  3 4 5
reassess my opinions
14. Not at all likable
15. Not at all admirable
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5
16. Not at all similar to 1 2  3 4 5 
me in life philosophy
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9 
6 7 8 9
17. Not at all similar to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
me on this specific 
case
Very consistent
Very independent
Very active
Very cooperative
Very central to 
the discussion
Very warm
Very strong- 
willed
Very perceptive
Very much 
a leader
Very fair
Very confident
Very reasonable
Made me reassess 
my opinions
Very likable
Very admirable
Very similar to me 
in life philosophy
Very similar to me 
on this specific 
case
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